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th eory. In res ponse. I a dmitt o a good degree of re lat iv is m" (p. 172). With these words. the 
aut ho r. a professo r o f ethi cs a t Creighton Univers it y in Oma ha. Ne braska. prese nts us with 
a succ inct rcv iew of his anal ys is of ethi ca l theo ry as applied to pro blem a reas of medical 
ethi cs . bas in g h is ethical an a lysis up o n a synthes is of the th o ught o f the Englis h em oto vists 
and the large ly subj ect ive Ka nti a n id ea l of perso na l autonom y. Dougherty s tresses 
instru cti o n o f va lues as the ba sis o f mo ra lit y a nd sta tes that ethi cs s hould refine and clarify 
mora l in structi o ns. 
When discussing medica l researc h. Dougherty ex presses shock and horror at the human 
research protoco ls carried o ut by the Naz i medi ca l expe rim enters (p . 143) . After desc ribing 
so me o f the horrors perpetrat ed during the seco nd World War. Doughert y ri ghtl y points 
out that the ideo logv w hich allowed such experiments deve lo ped well before the seco nd 
World War. But. iro nica lly . w hen assigning ca uses fo r the Naz is' abuse of human right s. 
Doughert y fail s to li st the type o f re lat iv isti c ethica l theory w hi ch he es po uses. 
The best pa rt of the book is a stud y of the e thica l and lega l respons ib ili t ies of hos pitals. 
Most of the signifi cant lega l decisions in rega rd to hospi tal care are prese nt ed and a ve ry 
c lear li st of patient rig ht s and hospi tal duti es is afforded. In thi s secti o n especia lly. 
D o ughert y di splays a co mprehens ive view of the va lues and act ions which wo uld im prove 
inst itutional health ca re. 
-Rev. Kevin O' Rourke. O.P. 
Director 
Center for Health Care Ethics 
SI. I.ouis University Medical Center 
Ethicsfrom a TheocentricPerspective, Vol.} 
Theology and Ethics 
by James M. Gustafson 
Chicago: Ulli" ersill ' o( Chicago Press, 1983. 345 PI'- $ 10.95. 
Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Vol. 2 
Ethics and Theology 
by James M. Gustafson 
Chicago: Unilwsill ' o( Chicago Press. 1984. 3261'1'- $25. 
These two works complement each other. The first develo ps a theocentric perspective; 
the second sets out to exp lore the ques tion. What diffe rence does a theocentric persp ecti ve 
make to the interpreta tion of moralit y" Together they constitute an intriguing and thought-
provoking study. While the work of an y Christian et hici st or moral theo logian presupposes 
ce rtain theological positions. it is rare to find these e laborated systematically and at length. 
A serious reader is compelled to grapple w ith man y of the most basic religious issues and 
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cannot avoid the challenge to articulate her o r his own theological stance. While 
Gustafson's positions ha ve provoked criticism and express ions of disagreement , they force 
one to respond. 
The key themes of the first work are the nature of God and the direction of H is purposes; 
man and the cosmos; religion. The author deve lops hi s case by challenging what he takes to 
be some assumptions which have beco me embedded in our culture. Man has beco me the 
measure in religion , theology and ethics. Religion and God have bee n put in the se rvice of 
human needs (p. 83). Gustafson sets o ut to reverse this assumption a nd. in so doing, 
develops a number of distinctive theses: God's purposes do not necessa ril y co incide with the 
human project seek ing welfare and happiness; the cosmos does not exist for man and for 
the furthering of hi s purposes; man is not the moral measure of all things (p. 91); it is 
questionable whether there is a special provide nce over the course of human affairs which 
assures that things turn out for human betterment , ifnot immed iately. then in the long run , 
and if not in human histo ry, then in afterlife . 
Does Gustafson mean that there is a rad ical dichotomy between human fulfillment a nd 
the purposes of God? This is what he seems to assert in the ea rlier pa rt of the book. If thi s 
were the case, and if God's purposes a re the ultimate measure of moralit y, then mora lit y 
could be in contradiction to the human fulfi llment. The achievement of God's purposes 
could require the nega tion of the human good. Later·he reasserts the view that " ... rheas is 
not the guarantor of human benefits" (p. 112). However. he later a ffirms ground s for 
confidence in God's benevo lence towards man. But thi s benevolence, he a rgues. does not 
support the assumption that " . .. God's purposes are the fulfillment of my own best interests 
as I conceive them" (p. 202). The dichotom y, then, is not between the divine purposes and 
genu ine human welfare, but rather between the divine purpose and what an individual may 
(falsely) judge to be hi s or her interests. Th is is a much less radical view than the earlier 
chapters suggest. It would imply that God's purposes and my own genuine best interests 
ma y co incid e. However, it is the stronger interpretation which see ms to be more dominant 
in Gustafson's thinking. 
In the second volume, the author summarizes his requirements for a comprehensive and 
coherent account of theological ethi cs (p . 143). It must developed in relation to four base 
points: (a) the interpretation of God and God's relation to t he world and. in pa rticular, to 
human beings and the interpretation of God's purposes; (b) the interpretation of the 
meaning of human experience - of hi storical life of the human community. of events and 
circumstances in which perso ns and collectivities act, and of nature and man 's particular 
participation in it ; (c) the interpretation of persons a nd co llectivities as moral agents, and of 
their acts; and (d) the interpretation of how persons and collectivitie ought to make moral 
choices and ought to judge moral acts . C hristian ethics is to be tested for adequacy with 
reference to four sources: (a) the Bible and Christian tradition: (b) their philosophical 
methods and princip les; (c) their use of scient ifi c information and other sources of 
knowledge about the world ; and (d) human experience. While these elements would , no 
d oubt , be accepted by most who seek to ex plicate a C hristian ethic it is not completely clear 
why some points are given more prominence than others. It is noteworthy that scientific 
sources and human experience are more significant than the Bible. But if this is to be tested 
for adequacy against the Bible, how is it justifiable to subordinate the Bible in this way? 
Some elements of the Biblical account are selected as "backing" (p. 144). These are se lected 
on the basis of coherence with conclusions drawn from the other sources. But is there not a 
danger here that on ly those elements of the Bible wi ll be taken into account which "back" 
conclusions a lready drawn from elsewhere? 
The central ex perience is "piety. " The New Testament accounts "inform" theocentric 
piety. The nature of the arguments as a whole seems to be the establishmen t of a kind of 
cognitive equi lib rium , where particular sources are given weight insofar as they cohere with 
and support other sources . The starting point is, then. a particular form of religious 
consciousness which grasps the patterns of interdependence in the world , including nature 
as signs of the divine power and ordering. 
The approach is then illustrated and concretized in a detailed discussion of four topics : 
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marriage and the fami ly; suicide; population and nutrition; and biomedical research 
funding. These discussions are finely constructed expos itions within the complex 
framework described. Some features call for special mention. The elements which emerge 
as normative are responsibility, attitudes a nd dispositions rather than rules or laws (p. 165). 
Sometimes thi s leads to a certain vagueness. For exa mple, accountability does not warrant 
coercive or intrusive methods to obtain genetic profiles. But it is not clearly explained why 
not (p. 165). Later it is argued that theocentric ethics backs a preference for vo lu ntary 
restraints (p . 247). If human self-d etermination is an aspect of well-being, however, and if 
the ultimately normative divine purposes do not coincide with human well-being, why is 
self-determination so significant? 
The d iscuss ion of suicide manifest s a profound, sympathetic understanding of the tragic 
circumstances which may surround the act. Two points may be mentioned. The strong 
sense of the bonds aris ing from the "wholes" or commun ities to which we belong is brought 
to bear on this question. Thus, where a person has some prospect of functioning in 
community, intervention to prevent such a one from committing suicide wou ld be .j 
warranted. But it is in the discussio n of exceptions that the theological focus beco mes 
clearest. Gustafson argues that there are justifiable suicides (p. 215). In the first volume, he 
had argued that God does not guarantee huma n welfare. Here he argues that there ca n be 
concrete circumstances of hopeless afniction where this lack of guarantee becomes the 
dominant rea lity. I n such cases , " ... there is reason for enmity toward God" (p. 216). This 
seems to spe ll out the implications of the fundamental position taken , namel y that God's 
purposes do not necessarily coincide with huma n welfare. Does this mean that where this I. 
non-coincidence is concrete ly experienced, one ma y be justified in a "quarrel" with God? 
There seems to be more than a rejection of faci le theodicies here . There is also a degree of 
confusion. If one li ves within the theocentric ethic described by G ustafson, one would 
accep t that God's purposes do not necessarily co incid e with o ne's human welfare. If one's 
circumstances are such that one's human welfare cannot be reali zed in any real sense. it 
would see m to follow that one shou ld simply submit. For is it not to be expected that 
sometimes the divergence between perso nal human we lfare and the wider purposes of God 
will become a matter of experience? Would it not the n follow that one should submit to 
whatever ma y be these wider. but unknown purposes? That is. should one not accept one's 
apparently meaningless suffering in the assurance that this somehow se rves those wider 
purposes of God? The only reaso n which could justify a quarrel with God would surely be 
that one holds. contrary to what has been argued in these works. that God's purposes ought 
to coincide with human we lfare. 
Another fundamental feature of the approach. namely. the discernment of 
responsibi liti es with reference to the "w holes" of whic h we are a paft. is particularly clear in 
the treatment of population and nutrition (p. 247). For Gustafson. the "whole" of current 
humanity and future generations is morally relevent. and common good of that whole 
s hapes moral judgments. e.g .. concerning artificial contracept ion (p. 229). The latter may 
be justified for the sake of this common good. Gustafson does not accept the Roman 
Catholic "method" of sexual abstinence beca use it runs counter to deep biologica l drives 
and can be detrimental to the interperso nal values of love and companionship (p. 246). But. 
I would suggest. such an argument seems to g ive human "well-being" a salience which . in 
Gustafson's view of things . it does not necessa rily have. 
In the finely wrought discussion of biomedical research funding. the problem of the 
appropriate relation between the individual person and the morally relevant whole of 
which she or he is a part has particular significa nce. Within Gustafso n's perspective. that 
approach which focuses almost exclusively on autonomy. informed consent. etc .. is 
shortsighted (p. 276). This may very well be the case. But if we move to Gustafson's view 
that the individual persons are not of abso lute value (p. 275). does this mean that the value 
of the individual is relative to one or a ll of the wholes? Gustafson's care in considering 
multiple considerations would check any crass instrumentalizing of the individual for the 
sake of the whole. But is not the danger of such instrumentalizing embedded in the basic 
presuppositions') 
88 Linacre Quarterly 
I have focused on two points: (I) the theological thesis that the di vine purposes do not 
coincide with human well-being, and (2) the st ructures of moral relevance according to 
which moral significance is to be determined by references to the mUltiple "wholes" of 
which we are a part. I have suggested that these give rise to certain tensions. Neve rtheless. 
the vol umes remain a profound contribution to theological and et hical reflection. Any 
subsequent work, to be taken seriously. will have to meet the exact ing standards which they 
have set. 
-Brian V. Johnstone, C.SS.R . 
The Catholic University of America 
What Are They Saying About 
Genetic Engineering? 
by Thomas A. Shannon 
Nell' York. PaL/lisl Press. 1985. vi+ 103 pages. $4.95. 
This is quite a good littl e introduction to some of the et hi ca l issues associated with the 
field of genet ics . In a remarkably brief space of less than 100 pages. the au thor covers a 
variety of fie lds of contemporary investigation and highlights their et hical component s. He 
begins wi th three chapters that deal with the re lationsh ips between science (and scientists) 
and society. the control of potentially harmfu l knowledge. and the nature of human 
personhood and responsibilities to the future . Then the aut hor moves to a discussion of the 
a ttempt to understand human nature through genetics (sociobio logy); the use of 
reco mbinant DNA technology; techniques for ass isting human concept io n and birth 
(sperm banks, am niocentes is, in vitro fer tiliza t ion. embryo tra~sfer. sex selection. 
surrogate motherhood. the fetus as an independent pat ien t o f medica l trea tment) ; gene 
transfer as therapy for genetic disease; induced modifica tio ns of plant and an imal species; 
and economic issues pertaining to t he fu nding of and access to the new thera pies and 
technologies. The author constructs his discussion by citing prominent aut horities in the 
fie ld : Paul Ramsey. Daniel Callahan. Leon Kass. Karl Rahner. Ric ha rd McCormick. 
Josep h Fletcher. Jeremy Rifkin. the National Conference of Cathol ic Bishops. 
This book does not attempt to break new ground. and wou ld be of little use to someone 
a lready familiar with the field. But for the reader who is interested in gainingan overview of 
the ethical dimensions of current genetic theory and technology, the work will serve the 
purpose admirably. The author's general position is midd le-of-the road. cautious. He is 
more concerned to ach ieve a balanced position by noting the strengths of the various views 
than to critici7.e any of them in a systemat ic fas hio n. Although the scholar wou ld be 
unlikely to profit from a reading of this work. it cou ld be very helpful as a text for an 
introductory course in bioethics. 
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-Gary M. Atkinson 
SI. Thomas College 
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